Beech ka Raasta
Practices in the Primary Education Bureaucracy

ASHWIN

This field study from Sirohi district, Rajasthan, reveals that, faced with staff shortages, resource constraints and mountains of paperwork, officials and teachers of the primary education department employ a variety of innovations that they term *beech ka raasta* to deal with challenges and meet targets. This article examines the strategies employed by the lower-level bureaucracy to get the job done in the *jugaad* framework, suggesting that these tactics are not employed to subvert policy but rather to implement it in the spirit of *seva*.

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Ashwin (*ashwin.vs13@apu.edu.in*) is a graduate of the Azim Premji University and works with the Madras Institute of Development Studies, Chennai.

1 Introduction

On the very first day of fieldwork, as my co-researcher and I set out to understand the everyday workings of the block education office (primary education) in Sirohi district, Rajasthan, we were confronted with the image of comfortably seated officials gossiping and toying with their smartphones.[1] This stereotypical image of inactivity and leisure, we soon realised, cloaked the actual work of ensuring the distribution of a circular that had arrived at the office. The circular demanded immediate attention since it mandated the implementation of certain programmes under the Swachh Bharat Abhiyan (Clean India Mission) for an entire week in all primary schools in the block.[2] We asked the officials how they were planning to distribute copies of the circular to the schools. The officials informed us that they would adopt a *beech ka raasta* or middle path to get the job done. This involved photographing the circular and sending a copy of it to all the teachers of the block who were members of a WhatsApp group. Mobile internet and smartphone technology thus accomplished the task within seconds. Later that day, hard copies of the circular were also distributed to teachers attending a workshop conducted by the Azim Premji Foundation (APF). The teachers were asked to deliver the circular to their respective schools and nodal headmasters.

The task would not have been possible had it not been for these innovative methods adopted by the officials. The circular mandated all schools to have a copy of the order regarding the Swachh Bharat Abhiyan programme for the coming week and this would have required the resource persons of the block to travel to every nodal school to deliver them.[3] Beech ka raasta or the middle path was a phrase repeatedly invoked by the officials throughout our study and it became abundantly clear that these innovative tactics were being employed on a daily basis. The purpose of our field study was to inspect the everyday workings of the primary education bureaucracy in Sirohi district of Rajasthan and it therefore became imperative to focus on the use of these innovative tactics in the daily routine of the officials at the block and school levels.

Our study was facilitated by the APF, a non-profit organisation that plays a key role in primary education in this region.[4] Sirohi district is divided into five blocks—Pindwara, Sheoganj, Reodar, Abu Road and Sirohi. The two blocks chosen for the study were Pindwara and Sheoganj, based on their proximity to Sirohi (our base) and differences in their sociopolitical

environment. Pindwara was the more underdeveloped block, typically described as an area where one was "stuck" if one was posted there.[5] Pindwara is also larger than Sheoganj and has a larger number of schools (some of which are situated in mountainous terrain). Sheoganj, on the other hand, was categorised as a "politically active and highly contested" block. It borders the nearby Pali district and has fewer schools.

APF staff members introduced us to the officials at the block level. No questionnaire was used for the interviews and interactions were kept open-ended. Given that the primary objective was to understand the everyday routines of these officials, it became necessary to spend as much time at the block-level office as possible. While most of the interviews were conducted jointly, my co-researcher and I worked individually on a few occasions so that one of us could spend time at the block-level office while the other spent time at a nearby school, interacting with teachers.

Throughout the field study, I used only a small notepad to make notes during interviews. Overall, 38 days were used for fieldwork, while the remaining duration of the field project was used for documentation and literature review. The methods used for the field study included participant observation and informal interviews. The former included staying at the block-level office as well as handling a few classes on a couple of occasions when the teachers were busy filling forms.[6]

Interviews were carried out with all the officials at the block-level office, which included two block education officers from Pindwara[7] and Sheoganj, four block resource persons from Pindwara, and four block resource persons from Sheoganj. We spent more time at the block-level offices than at the schools, given that the objective of our study was to understand the functioning of a block-level office. However, keeping in mind the importance of teachers and the headmaster or headmistress in implementing policy decisions, we managed to visit about 15 schools across both blocks. We also had the opportunity to attend two school nodal meetings in both blocks and had a very brief interaction with the additional district education officer and district education officer, Sirohi, as well as an official of the Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (SSA) district project office.

Each block resource centre is headed by a block education officer who is assisted by the block resource persons. Ideally, each block is also supposed to comprise two additional block education officers and a clerk or peon. Similarly, the primary education schools in the area are divided into nodal groups, each headed by a nodal headmaster or headmistress. Each school has a headmaster or headmistress, and teaching staff. However, what ought to be in place was hardly ever so. There is a shortage of personnel at both block and school levels, and Pindwara fared worse than Sheoganj. Some schools, as it turned out, had more teachers than required, while others were severely understaffed. Faced with such challenges, these officials were required to produce enormous amounts of paperwork under various central and state government schemes. The production of this paperwork was designated, amongst other tasks, as "monthly targets."

These monthly targets mandate up-to-date maintenance and filing of records at the block and school levels for various central and state government schemes. The block resource persons are responsible for achieving their monthly targets, including carrying out inspections under schemes such as the Reading Campaign and Continuous and Comprehensive Evaluation (CCE), making sure that schools follow the right to education (RTE) norms and meet the SSA requirements.[8] The results of these inspections are registered in a questionnaire covering all the guidelines to be met by the school. In addition, they are required to follow orders from the higher levels of the bureaucracy. These include passing circulars such as the one about the Swachh Bharat Abhiyan, the organisation and coordination of workshops for teachers, and monthly meetings for nodal headmasters or headmistresses as well as heads of schools to explain new directives and guidelines. Similarly, teachers in the schools are expected to prepare records under the Reading Campaign, CCE and Mid-day Meal schemes, as well as records of other expenses and activities, all of which are subject to inspection by resource persons of the block and to surprise/routine checks by seniors (the block education officer or district education officer). This huge load of paperwork is made considerably difficult by the absence of sufficient human resources (teachers and clerical staff). It was not surprising, therefore, to see the amount of time invested by both schools and block offices in preparing these documents for inspection.

2 Exploring Beech ka Raasta Tactics

Our respondents (block officials from Pindwara and Sheoganj) were of the opinion that the legislation of new laws such as the RTE and the introduction of schemes such as the Reading Campaign had led to an increased investment of time in the production and maintenance of files and registers. They believed that these tasks were the responsibility of the "administrative" staff and not the "academic" staff. Though the distinction does not hold good in practice, as both administrative and academic functions coalesce in the same block resource centre, our respondents identified themselves as "academics" and not "administrators." We were told repeatedly that the requirements of the profession (singling out the administrative tasks) and the challenges faced in implementing policy directives were too enormous to carry out without resorting to innovative tactics, shortcuts and the beech ka raasta. These tactics were mostly invoked to achieve the monthly targets and daily administration tasks (particularly in schools) of block officials, teachers and heads of schools. The dilemma facing these officials is obvious—staying committed to the implementation of policy but facing considerable constraints in doing so. At the block level, in Sheoganj particularly, the block resource persons also make use of the APF resource person to distribute circulars and relay messages to schools, attend and contribute to nodal meetings and help in arranging and running training workshops and meetings.[9] However, it is worth noting that this is partly because the resource person has, over nearly eight years in Sheoganj, been part of APF's initial programmes

in the region, visiting every school in the block and enjoying a terrific rapport with most of the teachers and officials. There is a higher degree of association with the APF resource person in Sheoganj than in Pindwara.

While the use of smartphones and WhatsApp is relatively new, older tactics are also employed. One of them concerns the treatment of the mid-day meal cook or helper.[10] One headmistress pointed out that the mid-day meal cook-cum-helper also serves as the caretaker or security guard for the school. The respondent insisted that with the staff shortage, she had to make the best use of available resources to keep the school functioning. "*Adjustment karna padta hai* (it is necessary to make adjustments)," she observed.[11]

Another cook-cum-helper at a school situated in the Pindwara mountains is similarly employed for other tasks. A teacher at this school reported that there were problems in the past when someone from outside the area (and community and caste) was appointed. Moreover, while the rules mandate that the school management committee take full responsibility for appointing a cook-cum-helper, this hardly ever happened and the responsibility fell on the teachers.[12] Appointing these individuals was not an easy task, the teacher informed, and it was expedient for the school to retain the same person. The tactic employed by the school was to erase the name of the individual from the register for a brief period citing "absence" or "removal from duty" and then reappointing him or her.[13]

These beech ka raasta methods are known and accepted throughout the lower levels of the bureaucratic structure, from the block level offices to the schools. These tactics are, in fact, promoted by the block officials in order to make sure that schools comply with the mandated paperwork. We observed the resource persons from both blocks regularly advising teachers and heads of schools on maintaining records and also revealing to them the questions they would be asked during surprise checks or inspections.

2.1 Understanding Beech ka Raasta through the Concept of *Jugaad*

One way of understanding the beech ka raasta method conceptually is to circumscribe it under the idea of *jugaad*, a term that has at least three distinct meanings, each of which was invoked in different contexts by our respondents. The literature on jugaad covers all three meanings with varying levels of emphasis, depending on the specific issue the authors seek to explain and analyse. It has been usurped by management gurus and promoters of entrepreneurship as an "innovative fix; an improvised solution born from ingenuity and cleverness;" in other words, a unique Indian way of arriving at solutions (Radjou et al 2012). In this sense, jugaad is seen as a quick-fix solution or a way to make do in cases where there are capital and resource constraints.

This understanding has, however, faced severe criticism for indirectly suggesting that poverty and resource constraints are not really problems but in fact opportunities for individuals to engage in an indigenous or unique way of innovation. In a scathing critique of this understanding, Birtchnell (2011) argues that jugaad cannot be seen as ingenuity but as "systemic risk" emerging in the wider context of poverty. He argues that the emphasis on this kind of innovation "forgoes the risk in the term's core practices: it recasts indigence as industriousness," converting "localised risk management into a parsimonious scientific and technical approach," thus in fact having a negative impact on society (Birtchnell 2011: 364).

Jeffrey and Young (2014) in their paper argue that unemployed youth in the city of Meerut in Uttar Pradesh have resorted to jugaad as a way of "euphemising their involvement in corruption." The authors argue that lower caste Dalit individuals (male) cultivate extensive social contacts and engage as "brokers" and "fixers" in the field of private education in the city to make large amounts of money. Their essay also focuses on the reproduction of neo-liberal idioms or notions of "enterprise" which, they empirically point out, do not flow in a simplistic top-down fashion. Their conceptual framework allows us to understand how ideas of enterprise are reproduced through the vernacular discourse of jugaad in specific social settings, reflecting aspects of an individual's class and gender. In a related sense, their argument also echoes Birtchnell's claims that the culture of jugaad itself emerges in the context of a social setting which is often vulnerable and necessitates quick, ad hoc fixes.

Interestingly, Jeffrey and Young (2014: 188) point out that jugaad is a "morally loaded word, connoting in some instances positive traits—thrift, quick thinking, imagination—and in other circumstances suggesting negative ones: a lack of principles, shoddiness, and a predilection for shortcuts." Further complicating the moral sense of the term and blurring the line between "virtue" and "vice," Jauregui (2014) argues that jugaad is "conceived as necessary" for "getting by." Drawing on fieldwork on the functioning of police in Uttar Pradesh, she provides various instances of how jugaad is practised amongst these individuals as a necessary means of "getting by" in contrast to the negative meaning and implications of the term (dealing with corruption).

It appears clear that the term jugaad therefore conveys at least three distinct meanings. One understanding, flowing from management gurus, romanticises the idea by highlighting aspects such as innovative thinking, low-cost solutions and adapting to adversity (Radjou et al 2012). The second has brought to light the aspect of "informal social contacts/networks" which are instrumental in pursuing one's goals for the purpose of earning money (Jeffrey and Young 2014) or as a necessary means of getting by (Jauregui 2014). Both these accounts blur the definition of the term as opposed to a third understanding which strictly conveys corruption or a specific kind of corruption, such as bribery (Jeffrey and Young 2014; Jauregui 2014). Drawing on my[14] own observations of the functioning of bureaucratic officials in the two blocks of Sirohi and based on their responses, I suggest that their use of the term beech ka raasta is better understood contextually using the idea of jugaad.[15]

As mentioned earlier, the officials consider resorting to these tactics in their everyday routine almost inevitable. These

practices range from the use of smartphone technology to tapping informal social networks and contacts (such as the resource person from APF or sometimes the foundation itself) in order to get the job done. Thus, in the case of distribution of the circular, the officials used WhatsApp innovatively to make sure the orders reached all schools. Similarly, the flexible treatment of the mid-day meal cook-cum-helpers is also demonstrative of ad hoc methods and making do under resource constraints. While these beech ka raasta methods are endorsed and in fact accepted throughout both blocks (and in extension one might say even in other blocks of the district), they are clearly demonstrative of at least two ways in which jugaad itself is understood—as quick-fix solutions and social networks or contacts. Incidentally, in such cases jugaad does not convey moral ambiguity as in the case of the "brokers" of Meerut (Jeffrey and Young 2014) but emphasises the adjustments needed to get the work done.

Over the short span of my fieldwork, I did not come across any respondent who attributed to the beech ka raasta method a sense of moral ambiguity or any explicitly negative meaning. It was only in response to the selection of teachers that my respondents (the block education officers of Pindwara and Sheoganj) referred to "connections" which young teachers tap for favourable placements. The reference to "connections" here comes close to the understanding of jugaad as the use of social networks or contacts in order to get by, euphemising corruption (Jeffrey and Young 2014) and bribery in the process and thus explicitly conveying a negative sense of the term. However, all my respondents invoked the term beech ka raasta only in the sense of a necessary adjustment required for their daily functioning.

2.1.1 Lipsky, Street-level Bureaucracy and the Idea of *Seva*

A study of front-line workers or street-level bureaucrats is incomplete without reference to Lipsky's pioneering work on the subject (2010). The major claim in Lipsky's work is that policy is also made at the level of daily interactions, that is, at the level at which these bureaucrats operate. Lipsky also argues that given the absence of effective monitoring and control mechanisms at the grass-roots level, front-line workers use "discretionary tactics" to subvert policy to their own means (2010: xi–xxi). The literature on street-level bureaucracy has since then moved on to focus on specific bureaucracies, stressed the influence of practices of professionalism and looked at discretionary tactics positively (Maupin 1993; Baldwin 2006; Evans and Harris 2004; Evans 2011; Ellis 2011; Rowe 2012). Literature on front-line workers or street-level-bureaucrats in India, particularly in the education bureaucracy, has tended to focus on the role of teachers in terms of transfers, performance, absenteeism and better pedagogy measures (Beteille 2009; Clarke 2003; Mooij 2008; Kremer et al 2005).

Throughout our field project, I did not come across any instance of officials at the block or school levels trying to subvert policy. Instead, what was constantly emphasised was the need to carve out a beech ka raasta in order to implement policy decisions. It is, therefore, interesting to understand their motivations in carving out beech ka raasta methods in order to accomplish their tasks.

Aiyar et al (2015) through their field study of front-line workers in the education bureaucracy in Bihar, argue that these workers are guided by a "legalistic" culture, derived from their understanding of tasks, "entirely as responsiveness to orders from above." These front-line administrators describe themselves as "powerless cogs in a large machine over which they have no control" (Aiyar et al 2015: 2). My respondents were similarly unequivocal in admitting that administration or bureaucracy was based on the single rule of *ji huzoori* or yesmanship. This term was used to define the block- and school-level offices which have no say in the affairs of daily administration and are merely ordered to implement orders from the higher authorities (such as the district office).[16]

However, a closer analysis of their work routine brought to light an important aspect of their motivation to work and their outlook towards their profession. Apart from the notions of hierarchy, my respondents defined their work as *seva* or service. Defining the teaching profession as a public service, they saw their role as teachers or academics shaping a new generation, in effect contributing to society and the country.[17]

The juxtaposition of seva and yesmanship presents these bureaucrats as committed officials interested in achieving what is demanded of them. In other words, despite the obvious challenges in terms of shortage of personnel and other resource constraints and the fact that they are burdened with more "administrative" than "academic" tasks, these officials try and ensure the everyday flow of bureaucratic work. Thus, the beech ka raasta methods become fundamental in their daily work.

3 Conclusions

In this article, I have attempted to show that apart from a clear understanding of hierarchy, these bureaucrats also attach meanings such as seva to their profession. The intertwining of both explains their functioning. At the same time, this article disagrees with the claims made by Lipsky (1980) that lower-level officials subvert or distort policy. In the case of my respondents, I clearly observed that they were committed to their job and did not look at it as a means of personal gratification (for monetary or other benefits). Neither did they attempt to subvert or distort policy. On the contrary, in the face of multiple challenges and constraints, they end up carving out beech ka raasta methods to get the job done.

Academic work on bureaucratic practices has also been the focus of scholars who have attempted to theorise the Indian state by ethnographically constructing it from below (Gupta 1995). In his book, *Red Tape: Bureaucracy, Structural Violence and Poverty in India* (2012), Gupta argues that the arbitrariness of bureaucratic action and procedure in India makes possible conditions of "structural violence" and as a consequence results in the failure of policies of "care" (or welfare) to the

marginalised masses. He demonstrates this by highlighting, among other instances, the case of a camp set up for elderly people. He demonstrates how this camp is representative of the ineptness of bureaucratic functioning, with faulty lines of communication, lack of punctuality on the part of government officials, random assessments of the age of the applicant and the sheer chaos of procuring entitlements from the state. Notwithstanding his other observations and claims, however, I am persuaded to disagree with him on the claims of bureaucratic practices being arbitrary.

First, the primary education bureaucracy in Sirohi and elsewhere in India suffers from a serious shortage of personnel and teacher absenteeism in addition to the political control of transfers (Beteille 2009; Clarke 2003; Mooij 2008). The staff shortage was the concern most cited by officials at the block and school levels.

Second, the huge load of paperwork thrust upon these officials as a result of various schemes enacted by the central and state governments takes considerable time and effort to fulfil on a daily basis. The case of the headmistress of a primary school in Pindwara (elaborated in endnote 6) and another instance in the same block where the teachers were more than happy to let me handle the class in order to finish filling up forms are cases in point. Finally, and with reference to Gupta's argument about bureaucratic practices being "arbitrary," I am inclined to argue that they must be viewed as systematic. I began this essay with the image of bureaucrats sitting around leisurely, an image which fits in with every stereotype of a *sarkaari naukri* (government job) in India. Yet, the leisurely picture actually cloaked the process of working. Harriss and Jeffrey (2013) in their critique of Gupta's (2012) work argue that "bureaucratic functioning is by no means as arbitrary and confused as Gupta suggests: rather, it systematically reflects caste, class and gender privileges." It is in the light of the constraints of my own fieldwork and skills that I acknowledge the lack of a caste, class and even gender analysis in this article. However, I hope to have elaborated on the beech ka raasta tactics that officials across the two blocks in Sirohi systematically use in order to get the job done.

In this article, I have not tried to defend the lower-level officials I interacted with. I stand by the claim that my respondents were committed to achieving targets, but their obsession with achieving the "monthly targets" is generally understood as producing, maintaining and supervising paperwork. The beech ka raasta methods, for instance, are primarily used and accepted to deliver the required paperwork.

Thus, where one would ideally want to evaluate the state of primary education in India by looking at qualitative aspects such as pedagogy or learning outputs, my experience links up with Mathur's (2012) claim that the Indian state is a mere producer of "paper truths." While these "paper truths" are obsessively produced in order to meet mandated targets, they do not address some of the fundamental problems in the primary education set-up in India, such as the shortage of teachers, the alleged political control of transfers in the area, and other resource constraints. This being the case, the proliferation of new schemes to gain qualitative output is counterproductive.

NOTES

1 The fieldwork was conducted as a joint independent field study along with my friend and peer Anuj Joshi. However, the arguments in this paper must be read entirely as mine. Any mistakes in translation or interpretation of the interviews or quotes cited are therefore entirely mine. I use the collective pronoun "we" to describe instances from the field and to detail responses from the officials and use "I" only in the latter part of the essay where I present my arguments.

2 I am referring here to Pindwara block of Sirohi district in Rajasthan.

3 There are a total of 187 primary, 65 secondary and 65 private schools in Pindwara block. Around 7–10 schools are clubbed together under a nodal system with one headmaster or headmistress of a primary school appointed as the nodal headmaster/mistress.

4 Azim Premji Foundation, http://azimpremjifoundation.org/About_Us.

5 The word "stuck" was used to mean that there was no hope of transfer for the next few years. Transfers are highly political and it is understood that one can get through only by "knowing someone with influence." Generally such people preferred areas like Sheoganj and the teachers in Pindwara were therefore stuck in the same school.

6 On one particular occasion in Pindwara block, the headmaster and teachers were busy updating their registers and documents for a block-level meeting while also trying to put up a disciplined show for the sub-district magistrate's visit on election duty (the school was to be used as a polling booth). In the process, all the teachers spent their time in the staffrooms while I was asked to handle students of Class 4. The headmaster soon left with my co-researcher for the block office while I spent the entire morning at the school, interacting with students and later with the teachers.

7 The block education officer of Pindwara is actually the additional block education officer, but since there was no block education officer appointed, the additional block education officer is in charge of the block education officer position as well.

8 The right to education (RTE) was enacted in 2009. The Continuous and Comprehensive Evaluation (CCE) programme is paired with the RTE Act and mandates that each school maintain a record of every student enrolled in elementary education (Classes 1–8) through a series of ongoing assessments instead of just year-end examinations. The Reading Campaign was introduced by the Rajasthan government in 2013 and seeks to regularly grade students' ability to read in English and Hindi and grade them accordingly. Grades A, B and C are awarded to each student and the teachers and heads of school are expected to keep track of the improvements in reading ability.

9 This was evident in the sentiments shared by the block education officer and his colleagues during a meeting in Sheoganj when he said that the views of the APF resource persons were not heard as "a voice from outside but as one of our own who has been working in the field for a long time." This incident is also demonstrative of this resource person's relationship with the officials. We were allowed to be present at the meeting and were surprised to see him occupying the discussion table and commanding the attention of all those assembled. Some of the headmasters in fact rushed to him after the meeting to clarify doubts further.

10 While the Mid-day Meal scheme in India has a long history, initially enacted by a few state governments (Tamil Nadu, for instance, introduced the scheme in 1956 during Kamaraj's regime), it gained the status of a centrally-sponsored scheme in 1995. The scheme is now funded by both central and state governments. The appointment of the cook-cum-helper is dependent on the size of the school. For example, one cook-cum-helper is mandated for schools with up to 25 students and two cook-cum-helpers for schools with up to 100 students. One additional helper is allotted for every additional 100 students. They are paid ₹1,000 as the base wage; however, this varies in each state.

11 This particular school's headmistress was also the nodal headmistress and in charge of a girls' primary school in Pindwara. It was practically impossible for her to run a school of 236 students with just three teachers. She managed this by clubbing classes and spent the entire interview period sorting out various records and complaining about the responsibilities of being the nodal headmistress as well. Ironically, the school opposite the one she was in charge of was a senior secondary school for boys which comprised 225 students and seven staff members (plus a peon).

12 Under Section 21 of the RTE Act, every elementary school (government, aided and special category) is required to have a school management committee that includes teachers and

parents. This is to ensure decentralised governance and community or local participation in the management and functioning of the school. The committee requires three-fourths of its members to be parents (with 50% of this proportion reserved for women). The rest is reserved for teachers, local authorities and students. Amongst other roles and responsibilities, the school management committee is also in charge of appointing the mid-day meal cook-cum-helper, a task that they rarely performed at the school I visited. The teacher informed me that the committee at this school hardly ever met or functioned and it thus fell upon him and his colleagues to appoint the mid-day meal cook-cum-helper.

13 The teacher did not elaborate on why such an adjustment was necessary. As far as the rules for the cook-cum-helper go, there is no provision for these individuals to claim regular appointment under the respective state governments (in this case, Government of Rajasthan).

14 From here on, I use "I" instead of "we", as I outline my arguments individually, based on our joint field experiences.

15 The term jugaad itself was never used by my respondents. They always used the phrase *beech ka raasta* whenever they referred to the innovative methods in their daily work routine. It is only for purposes of conceptual clarity that I use the term jugaad in order to understand the phrase beech ka raasta.

16 The idea of bureaucratic hierarchy is so well-internalised amongst these officials that it borders on parody. In one instance we observed the block education officer of Sheoganj (an otherwise strong and decisive man) rush nervously into the office demanding the cutlery set reserved for the exclusive use of higher officials. The set was required to serve tea and snacks to the district education officer who happened to be in the block office. It was the only time I witnessed both the block education officer and the block resource person absolutely frantic as they searched every nook and corner for the cutlery set. It was not, however, to be found. As I glanced at the block education officer's cabin, I saw that he had seated himself on the visitor's chair while reserving his own for his senior.

17 The idea of seva is understood as tied to Hindu culture and tradition. All the bureaucrats I interacted with were in fact Hindus (most of them upper-caste as well) and as mentioned in the essay, invoked *seva* to reiterate the idea of serving the country.

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