Judicial fortitude versus executive overreach: Appointment of judges to Indian higher judiciary (2014–22)

Sabhapandit, Swarati (2026) Judicial fortitude versus executive overreach: Appointment of judges to Indian higher judiciary (2014–22). Economic & Political Weekly, 61 (18). pp. 57-64. ISSN 0012-9976

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Abstract

Although judicial autonomy was acknowledged in independent India, the framers drafted an executive-led appointment system. It was during the Emergency (1975-77), when the judiciary came under the direct assault from the political executive, questions concerning the constitutional system of appointment were posed. Subsequently, the Collegium system of appointment was preserved and deemed essential for maintaining judicial autonomy. However, in 2015, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) attempted to reinstitute executive supremacy over judicial appointments, posing a direct threat to judicial independence. This study examines the administration of appointments and transfer of judges of the higher judiciary under the BJP dispensation.

Item Type:	Article
Authors:	Sabhapandit, Swarati
Document Language:	Language English
Subjects:	Social sciences > Law > Civil procedure & courts Social sciences > Law > Civil procedure & courts > Courts > Judges
Divisions:	Azim Premji University - Bengaluru > School of Development
Full Text Status:	Restricted
URI:	http://publications.azimpremjiuniversity.edu.in/id/eprint/7719
Publisher URL:	https://doi.org/10.71279/epw.v61i18.43886

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