Dissolving a bilateral partnership

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Dalakoti, Harshika (2025) Dissolving a bilateral partnership. Social Choice and Welfare. ISSN 0176-1714

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Abstract

We consider a model where two agents, who own different shares of a resource, need to dissolve their partnerships efficiently. Both the agents have loss averse preferences (Tversky and Kahneman in Q J Econ 106:1039–1061, 1991; K szegi and Rabin in Q J Econ 121(121):1133–1165, 2006; K szegi and Rabin in Am Econ Rev 97(97):1047–1073, 2007). The efficiency is defined such that the ex-post sum of material valuations and gain–loss utilities is maximized. We show that no feasible, efficient, dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanism exists in this model.

Item Type:	Article
Authors:	Dalakoti, Harshika
Document Language:	Language English
Subjects:	Social sciences Social sciences > Economics
Divisions:	Azim Premji University - Bengaluru
Full Text Status:	None
URI:	http://publications.azimpremjiuniversity.edu.in/id/eprint/6871
Publisher URL:	https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-025-01640-8

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